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JURISPRUDENTIAL UNDERPINNINGS OF LAW, ESPECIALLY
INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE BASIS FOR TRUE PROGRESS & REFORM

Morse Hyun-Myung Tan*
I. Introduction
Notwithstanding current postmodern 2 wariness
regarding universal, objective norms, an immutable and
perennial jurisprudence of international law 3 must hold true
for all people everywhere. 4 If it is not for all people
everywhere, how truly and rightfully "international" or
* Senior Research Fellow, the University of Texas School
of Law; JD,
Northwestern University School of Law. The author would like to
thank Professors Anthony D'Amato and Victor Rosenblum for
reviewing drafts of this article. Thanks to Anna Sabayrac and Fabio
Moon for their research assistance.
2 See GENE EDWARD VErTH, JR., POSTMODERN
TIMES: A CHRISTIAN
GuIDE TO CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT AND CULTURE (Crossway Books
1994) (presenting a trenchant evaluation of postmodernism). Richard
Rorty goes so far as to call this culture, sadly enough, "postmetaphysical."
RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY &
SOLEDARITY, intro., ch. 1 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1989). Rorty's term
and work, taken descriptively, accurately takes the pulse of the culture,
but does not provide the best prescription for the malady.
3 Conversation with Anthony D'Amato, Judd and
Mary Morris
Leighton Professor of Law at Northwestern University School of Law
(Spring 2001). D'Amato asserted that jurisprudence serves as the
proper foundation of international law. This foundation presently
remains visible, but perhaps more subtly in its applicability to law in
general.
4 Harold J. Berman, who held an endowed chair at Harvard
Law
School, states, "The conventional concept of law as a body of rules
derived from statutes and court decisions-reflecting a theory of the
ultimate source of law in the will of the lawmaker ('the state')-is
wholly inadequate to support a study of a transnational legal culture."
HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REvOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 11 (Harvard Univ. Press 1983).
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"transnational" would it be? 5
Stale legal thinking, stuck in a relativistic and
closed positivism, 6 lags behind the renewal of scholarship
in philosophy and segments of the social sciences that
8
increasingly recognize the realities of justice, 7 virtue, and9
law."
"higher
as
a higher standard, sometimes referred to
The reputation of the legal profession and the quality of
legal systems hinge on the type of response elicitedwhether the legal world joins in the renewal found in other
' The father of international law, Hugo Grotius, wrote prodigiously on
higher law and justice vis-A-vis international law. See, e.g., HUGO
GROTiUS, DE IURE PRAEDAE COMMENTARIUS: COMMENTARY ON THE

LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY (Gwladys L. Williams & Walker H. Zeydel
trans., Oceana Publications 1964) (1604); HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE
RIGHTS OF WAR & PEACE (William Whewell, trans. Cambridge Univ.
Press 1853).
6

See, e.g., JOHN AusTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (Robert

Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1985) (1885); JOHN AusTiN, THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DFTERMNED (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1995) (1832);

JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, NATURE AND

SOURCES OF THE LAW (2d ed., MacMillian 1948) (1909); HANS
KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal.
Press 1967) (1923); HANS KELsEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND

STATE (Anders Wedberg trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1946). Kelsen
and Austin are both deemed leading proponents of legal positivism.
Although not as easily recognized as such, Gray also qualifies as a type
of legal positivist of a different mold from Kelsen and Austin.
7 See

ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE ANTHOLOGY 249-89

(Anthony

D'Amato ed., Anderson Publishing Co. 1996) (discussing justice);
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, ch. 7, 12 (Oxford

Univ. Press 1980) (same).
8 See e.g., PETER KREEFT, BACK TO VIRTUE (Ignatius Press 1992)
(bringing back classical understandings of virtue); ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1984) (laying
out the limits of emotivism and discussing moral crisis); ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (Univ. of Notre
Dame Press 1988) (critiquing the exclusion of virtue).
9 See EDWARD CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Cornell Univ. Press 1928).

2

2:1

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 11

disciplines, or whether it stays in fashionable or trendy ruts.
Principles of justice, higher law, and virtue form the
best foundation of any legal system and for the
practitioners therein. The need and desirability of such a
foundation are even more pronounced when it comes to the
international realm. These principles encompass the search
for the uniting, universal umbrellas built into the very
fabric of the universe, as well as the common ground of
humanity across cultures. Put another way, this article
proposes the unifying theory of jurisprudence, which I
contend provides the best basis for law and legal systems
worldwide. Anything less than this common denominator
would prove unfit as the groundwork for international legal
regimes, because member state cultures can vary
considerably.
Harold Koh, the current Dean of Yale Law School,
writes:
During the classical period of international
law, the causal question of why nations obey
was generally conflated with the normative
question of why they should obey, which
was in turn usually answered by "semitheological" reference to the "higher law"-the "law of nature," of which international
law was but a part. Before the Roman
empire, religion served as the paramount
source of the law of nations. In Roman law,
Gaius defined jus gentium in terms of "law
common to all men."
The Preface to
Justinian's Institutes, published in 533 A.D.,
began with
observations
about the
relationship between the law of nations and
natural law. . . . Nor did medieval legal
scholars
distinguish
municipal
from
international law, instead viewing the law of

3
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nations, understood as jus naturae et
gentium, as a universal law binding upon all
The law of nations was
mankind.
private as well as public,
embrace
to
thought
domestic as well as transborder transactions,
and to encompass not simply the "law of
states," such as rules relating to passports
and ambassadors, but also the law between
states and individuals

. .

international and

domestic law together constituted a unified
legal system, with domestic institutions
acting as important interpreters and
enforcers of international legal norms.10
The pedigree of this perspective is extensive over
millennia, and still today, it provides a foundation for law
in general, and international law especially.
The Nazi Holocaust starkly demonstrates the need
for an international jurisprudence based upon higher law,
virtue, and justice. Atrocities were done "legally" at times
under German law and at the command of German
authorities.11 In order for one outside of German society,
10

Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106
YALE L.J. 2599,2604-05 (1997) (citations omitted).
'" The Hart-Fuller debate in the HarvardLaw Review concerning the

jurisprudential implications of the case of the grudge informer places
the contrast between higher law and positivism in sharp relief. Lon F.
Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to ProfessorHart, 71
HARV. L. REV. 630, 648-57 (1958); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 90, 616-20 (1958).

This case concerns a woman inNazi Germany, who, pursuant to the
Nazi Act of 1934, reported insulting remarks about Hitler made by her
husband as a pretext for getting rid of him. The husband received a
death sentence, which was commuted to a military assignment at the
front. Later, a West German court convicted her pursuant to the
German Criminal Code of 1871 for illegally depriving a person of his
freedom. Most notably, the court of appeals called the statute the
woman used as her pretext "contrary to the sound conscience and sense
4
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such as the Nuremberg Court, to decry these murders and
other abuses, there had to be some basis independent of
German positive 12 law. 13

There seems to be no better

grounding than higher law and justice. 14
Cicero, for example, advanced a higher law, virtue,
and justice position. Among many passages, Cicero wrote:
But if Justice is conformity to written laws
and national customs, and if, as the same
persons claim, everything is to be tested by
the standard of utility, then anyone who
thinks it will be profitable to him will, if he
is able, disregard and violate the laws. It
follows that Justice does not exist at all, if it
ofjustice of all decent human beings." Hart, supranote 11, at 619.
12 The Nazis used the positive pronouncements of Oliver Wendell

Holmes to justify the neutering of the mentally handicapped in
Germany. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) ("Three generations
of imbeciles are enough."). Given Holmes' positivism there exist few
resources in his jurisprudence to criticize such eugenic practices. See,
e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40
(1918) (elucidating Holmes's positivism and rejecting natural law);
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law 10 HARV. L. REV. 457
(1897) (same).
13 The Nuremberg Trials marked the first instance
in history where
international war crimes were tried in a court. The Chief Prosecutor,
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, explicitly grounded the
prosecution in higher law.
14 If there does not exist an objective, just basis from which to say the
Holocaust was wrong, would it not be intensely problematic then to try
the Germans on an ex post facto basis in an unprecedented,
international tribunal? On what basis was there legitimate, actual
notice that the Germans who legally obeyed orders from legitimate
authorities to gas their victims were guilty of a crime if not that these
Germans also have the higher law and a sense of justice within them?
Conscience is a beacon of the higher law and justice, and every person
has a conscience. Granted, conscience can become dulled, seared,
tainted, or skewed, but it does exist in every human being, a classic
notion accepted by most of Western Civilization during the past two
millennia.

5
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does not exist in Nature, and if that form of
it which is based on utility can be
overthrown by that very utility itself. And if
Nature is not to be considered the
foundation of Justice, that will mean the
destruction [of the virtues on which human
society depends]. For where then will there
be a place for generosity. 15
Thus Cicero, widely hailed as the greatest legal mind of his
time, directly repudiates legal positivism and selfish
utilitarianism, and vouches for higher law, virtue, and
justice as the soundest basis for law, including international
law.
This article does not attempt to delineate and
demarcate all the contours of higher law, virtue, and justice
because such a task extends beyond its scope. It merely
seeks to establish the existence of higher law, virtue, and
justice so that those who have categorically excluded such
notions, especially those who have done so without much
thought, would at least have the opportunity to consider or
reconsider these notions.
Ironically enough, even those who categorically
exclude virtue, justice, and higher law typically hold to
them nonetheless in some way, shape, or form. For
example, the murder of innocent human beings is held to be
an injustice that violates higher law and virtue by
practically all people everywhere. This simple observation
reflects that we humans, of whatever society, bear the
imprint of a conscience, the faculty of perceiving the virtue,
justice, and higher law. 16
5

CERO, LAWS

§§ I, XV, reprinted in

THE GREAT LEGAL

48 (Clarence Morris ed., Univ. of Penn. Press 1997).
PHILOSOPHERS
16
AS Berman writes:
[Tlhe underlying legal principles had not only a logical aspect,

6

2:1

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY

15

The jurisprudential view this article asserts does not
belong exclusively to any political party or government; it
remains the common inheritance of all humans everywhere.
It refuses to wear the Emperor's new clothes 17 particular to
every age and place.
Intentionally, I do not focus on applying the
foundation herein to any particular legal, political, or social
issue,1 8 except in passing or as a brief example, lest the
reader's position in one direction or another obfuscate the
desirability of this framework in general.
Also, a
foundation does not form an entire edifice, and certain
portions of the edifice may directly touch on the foundation
more than others. Similarly, one can analyze where this
jurisprudential foundation touches more or less directly on
variegated aspects of the entire edifice of law.19 Such
being subject to reason, but also a moral aspect, being subject
to conscience. Therefore, not only an analytical or logical
systematization was required, which would strive for
consistency in the law, but also a moral systematization,
which would strive for equity . ... The logical, moral and
political aspects of basic legal principles were summarized in
the concept of natural law. This was a substantially different
concept for that held by the Greeks and the Romans. The
earlier natural law had been defined as the right of every
man-as it was put in the first title of Justinian's Digest-to
receive what was his due; natural law was justice, equity, what
was right; it was an ideal law, the law not of the state but of
nature itself, to which the law of the state might or might not
conform.
Berman, supranote 4 at 253-54.
" This refers to the well-known Hans Christian Anderson story of an
Emperor, who is cleverly persuaded that wearing only his
undergarments is in vogue.
's For such application to various issues and policies, see NATURAL
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC POLICY (David F. Forte ed.,
Georgetown Univ. Press 1998).
'9 For example, this paper would have more direct relevance to the
common law idea of malum in se, than malum prohibitum in criminal

7

2:1 TENNESSEE JoURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 16

analysis, however, lies largely outside the scope of this
article.
Though higher law can be used as a pretext for
assorted forms of mischief, its abuse should not lead to a
denial of its existence. Indeed, these ideas of virtue,
justice, and higher law themselves would seek to bring a
corrective to such abuse. This article simply attempts to
show the existence and helpfulness of higher law, virtue,
and justice employed correctly, so that at least a few more
glimmers may emerge from its relative eclipse in both
modem and postmodern legal scholarship.2 °
A. Relevance
The most important and foundational relevance for
this framework is that it proposes the unifying, universal
foundation of jurisprudence, which itself is the proper
foundation for law. Such relevance is more striking in
international law,21 which cuts across national cultures. To
state it differently, not a single facet of law can live
completely independent of justice, virtue, and higher law
and still flourish in good health.2 2 The convocation of
law.

Another example is the differing notions of viciousness, as

mens rea
opposed to virtue, found in adjusting the requisite
proportionately with the punishment levels in criminal law. The
relegation of this example to a footnote perhaps helps accentuate the
idea that specific applications of this jurisprudential foundation would
to other writings besides this one.
fall
20
See Peter Kreeft, Darkness at Noon: The Eclipse of Permanent
Things, July 1990, available at
www.ewtn.com/libraryiTEOLOGY/FR91102.HTM (last visited Jan.

18, 2006).
This relevance emerges time and again for this legal academic, who

21

has taught courses such as Public International Law, International
Organizations, and Human Rights.
22 For example, even a seemingly unrelated legal provision, such as
stop signs at a crowded intersection, still has virtuous and just goalsas well as principles touching on higher law. Trying to prevent injury

8
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sources in this article primarily seeks to establish the
existence of justice, virtue, and higher law that can serve as
an efficacious filter and a perspicuous lens through which
to interpret, analyze, synthesize, and critique not only
transnational and international law, but also positive law as
a whole.
The widespread convergence of this recognition by
some of the most enduring thinkers from both the East and
the West, 23 which I trace below, gives tremendous
credibility to the common reality and truths that they
present. Taken as a group, they do not speak from the
same cultural, temporal, or professional prejudices, biases,
and patches of ignorance particular to any specific slice of
society. 24
If such truth is immutable, how recently these
people acknowledged this reality is irrelevant. If anything,
the range of scholarship helps to assure us that they are not
speaking from the same cultural, temporal, and professional
prejudices, biases, provincialities, or patches of ignorance
particular to any specific group, including twenty-first

or death to innocent human beings would be one. The benefits of order
instead of chaos or anarchy constitute another. Fairness is implicated
in that the first to arrive has the right of way. Moreover, recklessly
rushing through a stop sign without stopping and causing an accident
would violate the virtue of prudence.
23 As an example, the work of Mencius, Mo Tzu, Plato, Aristotle, and
others will be discussed below.
24 It can broaden us beyond our particular time and place with its
myopic focus on the recent, while providing needed correctives.
Chronological, geographical, ethnic, or other types of snobbery or
narrowness have no place in the academy, jurisprudence, law, or
anywhere else for that matter. Therefore, what these classic Western
and Eastern sources say should not receive summary dismissal by
anyone.
See C.S. Lewis, Introduction to ATHANASIUS, DE
INCARNATIONE (1945); see also C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN
(7th ed., Macmillan 1962), which some consider the best book of the
20th Century on this topic.

9
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25

century legal scholars.
The present legal academic world regularly
celebrates some of the dimensions of justice, virtue, and
higher law, even if these ideals sometimes fall under
different rubrics. After all, cases such as Brown v. Board
of Education,26 clearly did not follow the then existing line
of positive law or certain elements of the then current,
broader culture of its time. Yet, cases such as Brown are
widely celebrated today as a paragon of justice and higher
law-a case virtuously brought and justly decided. The
existence of transcultural justice, virtue, and higher law is
relevant everywhere and forms, where necessary, the basis
for legal reform.2 7
Similarly, we find massive corroboration in these
virtuoso thinkers and writers of sound, even outstanding,
intellect and sense of justice themselves. Therefore, these
classic Western and Eastern sources should not receive
deprecation, be ignored, or be dismissed. Indeed, the more
erudite one is, the more likely one will have a familiarity
with such major thinkers. This article mines from major
veins, although the Eastern sources are generally not wellknown or appreciated in the West.
Basic metaphysical questions not only are
28
However,
addressed by, but also arise from, this article.
merely a few questions among the many that may be raised
See LEWIS, supranote 24.
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
27 One need only look at whatever legal reform movement that one
champions in order to realize that a relativistic positivism (law as it
25

26

currently exists and finds enforcement by those with power) would
foreclose the possibility of reform. If one touts the notion of
"progress," such progress must be based upon some standard toward
which society is progressing. To the extent a society violated justice,
virtue, and higher law, it would regress proportionately.
28 Questions of ontology, epistemology, and ethics abound in this area
and cannot possibly receive comprehensive treatment in a single essay
of this length.
10
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will be singled out for treatment hereinafter to clear some
of the detritus that can obscure the view of justice, higher
law, and virtue-realities that impact all of mankind,
whether consciously or not.
B. Relevant Objections and Other Challenges
1. Epistemological Issues
The scientific method, including empirical
methodologies, has proven a fruitful and useful modus
operandi for many things. It can be used productively,
especially in the so-called natural sciences, but also to a
lesser extent in the so-called social sciences or humanities
including law.
Some of the greatest gifts that the
Enlightenment and modernism periods have bequeathed
upon us derive from knowledge garnered through the sound
and rigorous application of these methods.
An
epistemology that limits itself to scientific methodologies
alone, however, necessarily impoverishes itself and proves
impractical, unwittingly self-contradictory, or both.
29
As the leading philosopher, Arthur F. Holmes,
philosopher of science, Delvin Ratzsch, 30 and other
contemporary and historical sources point out, even socalled "neutral" applications of scientific methodologies
necessarily predicate themselves on principles unprovable
solely by scientific methodologies. 31
Otherwise, it
becomes tautological, self-contradictory, or at best, begs
29
30

See, e.g.,

ARTHUR HOLMES, ETHICS (Inter-varsity Press 1984).
DELvIN RATZSCH, SCIENCE AND ITS LImiTS:
THE NATURAL

(2d ed., Inter-varsity Press
2000).
31 For example, scientific assumptions unproveable by science include:
SCIENCEs IN CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE 101

(a) that the senses, sometimes with instrumental aid, can access reality;
(b) that the human mind can then inductively ascertain truths from
what the senses apprehended; (c) that there exist knowable truths about
the reality of the physical world.

11
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the questions: why exalt scientific methodologies above all
others and why exclude other methodologies and
frameworks?
One may respond-because it works. But then,
why must pragmatic, practical, or utilitarian considerations
be deemed foundational? 32 Something may be pragmatic
yet brutal, practical but vicious, utilitarian yet unjust. For
example, it may be pragmatic for the purpose of retaining
power for a dictator to relegate conscientious dissidents
who are neither treasonous nor treacherous to heavy labor,
torture, and execution in concentration camps. Such
pragmatism collides directly with virtue, justice, and higher
33
At the same time, pragmatic or utilitarian
law.
considerations, rationales, or justifications do not
necessarily a priori exclude all other methodologies and
frameworks.
Another may say-because it comports with reality
Herein lies a better response, but one that also
facts.
and
contains some untenable dichotomies such as the fact-value
split. Since knowledge, including the scientific kind,
should accord with truth, which conforms to reality,
scientific methods can provide valuable tools.
Yet, they are not the only tools that can access
objective reality. As a matter of fact, just and virtuous
realities are not best established by scientific
methodologies. Just as scientific methodologies function
through direct sensory or instrumental apprehension, the
work of a healthy conscience, 34 especially a well-cultivated
and developed one, can directly apprehend just and
32 CORWIN,

supra note 8, at 4-5. These philosophies cannot justify

themselves by themselves; otherwise, they are reduced to tautologies.
33 See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE UTIITARIANS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Columbia Univ. Press
1946); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (2d ed., Hackett
Publishing 2001) (1863).
34 See J. BUDZisZEWSKI, THE REVENGE OF CONSCIENCE: POLITICS AND
THE FALL OF MAN (Spence Publishing Co. 2004).

12

2:1

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW

& POLICY 21

virtuous realities comporting with higher law better than
the best scanning electron microscope.
Excruciating
torture of a child for no other reason than the torturers'
sadism is readily apprehended as being unjust by those who
possess even a half-decent conscience. 35 It is possible,
however, for a conscience to be clouded, seared, calloused
or twisted, just as different physical pathologies can hinder
proper body function. The acknowledgment of conscience,
which can apprehend justice, higher law, and virtue, should
be no more impugned than the existence of DNA.
2. The Basis for This Basis
A healthy conscience is the standard by which one
judges normality in the moral sense. That is why ignorance
of the law is generally no excuse in Anglo-American
criminal law. In other words, the conscience engraved into
a person, regardless of whether the person has ever even
heard of the handiwork of the legislatures, judiciaries, or
executives, should prevent the occurrence of crime.
Various higher law theories, which are the mainstreams of
the common law tradition, 36 establish this point. 37
.

3' This

counterexample refutes utilitarian calculus. To put it another
way, if you have a large enough crowd of sadists torturing an innocent
child, who derive massive amounts of pleasure that exceed the pain of
the lone child, then such behavior would be allowed under
utilitarianism because the total pleasure would outweigh the total pain.
That such an approach is morally reprehensible is readily apparent to
those with even a half-functioning conscience. Thus, such actions are
correctly deemed unconscionable, as violative of justice, virtue, and
higher law.
36 See ROBERT D. STACEY, SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE
AND THE
BLACKSTONE'S LEGACY TO AMERICA (ACW Press
1989). In Anglo-American history, Blackstone's writings constituted a
standard part of legal education. His works formerly graced the desks
of law offices throughout the United States and England.
36 The present McCormick Chair at Princeton, Robert
George, writes
cogently from this school of thought in several works. See, e.g.,
COMMON LAW:

13
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Some would claim that justice is simply defined
Such a stance undermines individual
socially.
responsibility. 38 For a physician at Ravensbruck or
Auschwitz to refuse to perform crude experimentation on
an unwilling patient that severely injures and eventually
kills the innocent concentration camp prisoner would be to
exercise virtue in accordance with justice and higher lawa law higher than Nazi dictates, no matter how legitimate or
exalted the government or military source within German
society. Nazi judges who refused to condemn innocent
people in spite of formalistic or positivistic pressures, such
as the Nuremberg Code, would be exercising virtue in
accordance with justice and higher law. If such virtue,
justice, and higher law did not exist, on what basis could
one critique, redress, or reform atrocities carried out during
such as the former Yugoslavia,
the Holocaust, or in places
39
Timor?
East
or
Rwanda,
This view necessarily undermines various forms of
ROBERT GEORGE, THE CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES: LAW, RELIGION, AND

MORALITY IN CRISIS (ISI Books 2001); ROBERT GEORGE, IN DEFENSE
OF NATURAL LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 1999); ROBERT GEORGE,
NATURAL LAW AND MORAL INQUIRY (Georgetown Univ. Press 1998).

See,

e.g.,

Nuremberg
Code,
available
at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/references/nurcode.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2006).
38 Long-time Harvard University Professor Lawrence Kohlberg deems
this level of moral development to be the highest of the six that he
proposes. See Lawrence Kohlberg, The Development of Modes of
Moral Thinking & Choice in the Years 10 to 16 (December 1958)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago); LAWRENCE
37

KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL
STAGES AND THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (1st ed., Harper & Row 1981).

'9 Other examples of international infamy along these lines include the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, for which the U.N. established special
tribunals; East Timor, for which a separate country was recently
formed; and Colombia and Peru, which often have come under the
judgment of both the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, as
well as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
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determinism, 40 whether biological, social, socio-biological,
or otherwise, which seek to eliminate the existence of
Such determinisms
volition and responsibility.4 1
presumably attract their adherents by eradicating
culpability, a convenient, but incorrect way to deal with
guilt and shame. It should be noted that removing
culpability negates responsibility, which pushes society
43

anomie, 42 and antinomianism,
anarchy,
towards
conditions that adherence to virtue, justice, and higher law
prevent.
A common, albeit irresponsible, escape attempt is
an agnostic skepticism, which is a position in and of itself.
If seeking logical consistency, why not be skeptical or
agnostic about skepticism and agnosticism? 44
Another error lies in embracing contradictory,
relativistic pluralism. 4 5 While recognizing that common
40

For a discussion of this point, see the philosophy of science works of

Oxford Professor Alister McGrath, who holds a Ph.D. in microbiology,
available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/-mcgrath/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2006).
4' FYODOR
DOSTOEVSKY, NoTEs FROM UNDERGROUND (Mirra
Dostoevsky satirizes
Ginsburg trans., Bantam Books 1974).
rationalistic, empirical determinism extensively.
42 The term is used particularly in the sociological sense
as employed
by scholars such as Emile Durkheim.
43 A term indicating lawlessness-not a condition favorable to the
existence of legal systems, institutions, or legal professionals to say the
least.
44 No one could function with a thoroughgoing skepticism or
agnosticism. If I did not firmly believe in the existence of this
computer on which I am typing this article or in the law journal
member who will read it, I would not be typing it right now. If I did
not believe in the existence of the chair I am sitting in, I would not
attempt to sit in it for the many hours I have in preparing this article.
Even functionally, thoroughgoing skepticism and agnosticism fail. I
am skeptical of the soundness of skepticism, yet not agnostic about
existing pitfalls in agnosticism. Most honest and sensible people could
not correctly claim to hold a thoroughgoing skepticism or agnosticism;
those who do, paralyze themselves.
45 See LESsLIE NEwBIGIN, TRUTH TO TELL: THE GOSPEL AND PUBLIC
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ground often exists between various worldviews, this view
plainly violates the law of noncontradiction when particular
worldviews adhere to mutually exclusive positions. Either
an objective standard of justice exists, or an objective
standard of justice does not exist. Both statements cannot
be true and concomitantly comport with reality.
This does not impugn true paradoxes or antinomies,
46
which only seem to contradict, but in reality do not.
Rather, I am talking about clear-cut A and not A instances
which cannot both be true and also correspond with reality,
according to this basic axiom of logic, philosophy, and
mathematics. To give another example, a person cannot
both have biological children and not have biological
children at the same time in any unified, literal sense. To
say otherwise would fly in the face of common sense.
As a leading Hindu philosopher acknowledged,
epistemological arms that embrace all views lead to selfstrangulation. As stated by G.K. Chesterton, the open
mind, like the open mouth, is intended to close down upon
something.47 That something includes the truths of justice,
virtue, and higher law that accord with the highest design
48
This position is cohesive and comports
of human nature.
1991) (providing a sound treatment of
pluralism).
46 For example, I do not presently deny such paradoxes as the wave or
particle duality of light, the way certain sub-atomic particles seem to
behave, elements of both genders existing in hermaphrodites, the
Trinity, or all three states of H20 (water vapor, liquid water, and solid
ice) existing at the triple point.
47 This epigram comes from the British author G.K. Chesterton. See,
e.g., G.K. CHESTERTON, ALL ISGRIST: A BOOK OF ESSAYS (Books for
Libraries Press 1931); G.K. CHESTERTON, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED
(Sheet & Ward 1956); G.K. CHESTERTON, As I WAS SAYING (Books for
Libraries Press 1966).
48 See, e.g., American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
Nov. 22, 1969, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basic2.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2006) (basing its pronouncements on
this premise).
TRUTH (W.B. Eerdmans
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with objective reality.
3. Lesser Alternatives
Historically, it was recognized that the common law
permits the correction of errors. 49
Formalistic or
positivistic cowardice should not prevent those with
authority to modify positive law from abandoning unjust
ruts. 50 Thus, we should not believe that human lawmakers,
adjudicators, or executors are so constrained to maintain
unjust laws-unless they unduly bind themselves with
formalist or positivistic shackles. 51 Nothing contained
herein, however, should be construed as necessarily
violative of constitutional order, as far as the allocation and
separation of powers are concerned. Nor should it be
employed as a pretext for judicial usurpation of legislative
or executive power-or any other usurpation of authority.
49

See JEFFREY A. BRAUiCH, Is HIGHER LAW COMMON LAW? READINGS

ON THE INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW

(F.B. Rothman 1999).
'0 See ANTHONY D'AMATO, JURISPRUDENCE: A DESCRIPTIVE &
NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW (Brill Academic Publishers 1984).
5' The doctrine of stare decisis or custom, as convenient and helpful as
it may be as an approach to procedure and order, should not be exalted
over justice. The common law does not advocate such a stance, and
international law should not embrace it. Yet, such a stance is not rare
de facto. Instead, virtue, justice, and higher law should reign above
slavish devotion to stare decisis or custom. See Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) ("Stare decisis is not an inexorable
command; rather it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical
formula of adherence to the latest decision."); see also Thomas Healy,
Stare Decisis as a ConstitutionalRequirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43,
87 (2001) ("The American commitment to stare decisis gradually
strengthened during the nineteenth century, due mainly to the
emergence of reliable law reports and a positivist conception of law.").
Contra id. at 71 ("Precedent, though it be Evidence of law, is not Law
itself, much less the whole of the Law."). Eschewing an overly rigid
application of stare decisis allows the overturning of cases such as
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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In other words, it accords, rather than clashes with, respect
for duly constituted52 authority including the legislative
powers of Congress.
Rabelais satirizes formalist insufficiencies in
Gargantua& Pantagruel.53 In this satire, the judge has an
elaborate array of formalities and procedures, but in the end
decides to make a random decision. This satire implies that
procedural integrity ipso facto is not enough to ensure
substantive justice.
Rather, substantive justice, as the dominant goal,
should be served by fair procedures. 54 Harold J. Berman
notes:
Berman writes of an approach that "should bring the three traditional
schools of jurisprudence - the political school (positivism), the moral
52

school (natural-law theory), and the historical school (historical

jurisprudence) - together in an integrative jurisprudence." Berman
supra note 4, at 44. Such an approach acknowledges the descriptive,
structural, and social order roles of positivism, the prescriptive function
of higher law, and the benefit of historical study to bring correctives to
bear as well as expose blind spots and provincialities of this time and
place. The more these three schools of thought can be harmonized,
applied, and integrated in a way that reflects the strength of each, the
better.
53 RABELAIs, GARGANTUA

& PANTAGRUEL (Jacque Le Clerq trans.,

Random House 1963).
First I view and review, read and re-read, ponder, weigh,
thumb and digest the bills of complaint, subpoenas,
appearances by proxy, reports of hearings, investigations,
instruments of deposition, petitions, articles of evidence,
requests, inquests,
rebuttals,
rejoinders,
allegations,
of former testimony,
confirmation
surrejoinders, surrebuttals,
objections,
grievances,
taken,
exceptions
acts, writs, bulls,
counter-objections . . . I decided in favor of the party who
won at the judiciary, tribonian and praetorial throw of the
dice.
Id. at 440-41.
Attorneys and judges sometimes look for procedural pretexts to
5
advance substantive concerns.
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The system of procedure was said to be
designed "to inform the conscience of the
judge"-a phrase later used in the equitable
procedure of the English chancery...
Indeed, the principles of reason and
conscience were proclaimed by the
ecclesiastical jurists as weapons against the
formalism and magic of Germanic law.55
The fictional Justice Keen is a prototypical
positivist, who can excel in the description of the particular
law in a given society. 56 Positivism also does well to
acknowledge and give due deference to the formulations of
legitimate authority, a primary position that the higher law
acknowledges, yet does not treat as an absolute guide to
substantive justice.
On the negative side, however,
positivism often adopts a false dichotomy between facts
and values. 57 According to this position, facts are public
and objective while values are only private and presumably
subjective. 58 If higher law and justice do in fact exist, why
should they find themselves relegated to private life
alone? 59 Such a view leads to hypocrisy, undermining
the
60
integrity of the unitary, whole person in society.
55

Berman, supranote 4, at 251.

56

Lon Fuller, Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616

(1949) (making each of the fictional judges prototypical of a school of
jurisprudential thought).
57 id.
58 Id.

59 See NEWBIGIN, supra note 46, at 63.
60 See VIRTuEs:

CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS ON MORAL CHARACTER

(Robert B. Kruschwitz & Robert C. Roberts eds., 1987).
It
impoverishes public life and leads to the double lives of those who put
on the fagade of a public persona that masks an execrable life outside
the public eye. Those in the legal or political realm cannot excuse
themselves from this in saying that though they consider something an
injustice as a "private citizen," they must mechanically maintain the
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The question stares us in the face-do international
law and other law have their basis in higher law and
justice? Or is it nothing more than a product of the politics
of professionals, politicians, diplomats, and other power
brokers, who may or may not have a firm, objective basis,
and who alone have 61sovereignty to decide the norms and
structures of society?

If no justice or higher law exists, then every reform
and every critique would fall into the morass of merely
subjective opinion. If all that exists is each person's
subjective opinion, then no grounds from which one could
say that one opinion is better than another exist. If not,
then on what permanent foundation would law stand or
toward what would it progress? If one removes the
cleansing cascade of higher law, virtue, and justice, then a
raw, cynical calculus of so-called Realpolitik would remain
like a crusted stain.
If objective bases in higher law and justice do not
exist, then ideological and Weltanschauung62 chaos,
conflict, and confusion follow. Epistemic despondence and
narrowness then tend to rear their ugly heads. Rather than
having no better grounds than the instability of relativism
or uneasy, but logically incompatible pluralism, many
authors aver a justice, virtue, and higher law foundation for
present law in their public capacities when it is manifestly unjust albeit
politically inexpedient for their own self-interested considerations.
While failure is common, it should not deny the goal of a virtuously
integrated person, virtuous, including just, and moral in private as well
as public life. Legislators, legal practitioners, judges, and other
professionals often have public dimensions to their lives that should be
no less moral or virtuous than their private lives. This applies to the
domestic realms and international spheres, as well as the interactions
between the domestic and international systems.
61

See MACHIAVELLI,

THE PRiNCE AND OTHER WRrINGS (Wayne

Rebhom trans., Barnes and Noble Classics 2003); Alexander Obolsky,
Law & Psychiatry Lecture at Northwestern University School of Law
(Fall 1999).
62 This is the German term for worldview.
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the super-structures of law.
This convergence and
confluence of great scholars bears witness to the fact that
virtue, justice, and higher law do, in fact, exist
independently of the vagaries of any mortal individual or
group. 63 They serve as the best basis for law, especially
international law.
When this reality is ignored and a society allows
oppressive laws to reign, the results can be nothing short of
catastrophic. Nazi Germany, Maoist China, and Stalinist
Russia are but three twentieth century examples of
totalitarian regimes that abused law and used it as a weapon
for oppression and repression. 64 Mass executions, gulags,
cruel human experimentation, and concentration camps
resulted. 65
As a positive contrast, by way of contemporary
introduction and treatment, it is fitting to include one
shining example of courageous communication of these
unpopular, yet no less just, realities: Nobel Laureate
Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn. Few, if any, people in
the twentieth century had more effectively borne eloquent
witness to higher law, virtue, and justice in reference to
such horrendous regimes, especially the brutal oppression
that Solzhenitsyn himself suffered. His writings and
addresses give hope that the truth of sound virtue, justice,
Various passages in Sophocle's Antigone bring this point out
lyrically. See SOPHOCLES, THE OEDIPUS PLAYS OF SOPHOCLES (Paul
Roche trans., Mentor 1958) [hereinafter OEDIPUS PLAYS].
64 RANDALL L. BYTWERK, BENDING SPINES: THE PROPAGANDAS OF
NAzI GERMANY AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (Michigan
State Univ. Press 2004); RHOADS MURPHEY, HISTORY OF ASIA 351-54,
379-82 (Addison-Wesley 1992).
65 While this response does not purport to provide
a historical survey of
the practices of such regimes, even a cursory scan would reveal that
many such historical treatments have well-documented the inhumane
and barbarous acts done in the name of law, or at least with the
permission of, including improper application or enforcement of decent
laws that were violated. The primary documents in the Nuremberg
trials are a case in point.
63
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and higher law can and will triumph over miswielded
force. 66In this way, Solzhenitsyn addresses the larger
questions of law with its best metaphysical moorings. For
these attainments, he has been heralded widely as a great
voice in an ethical and legal wilderness.
These questions are often ignored to our peril. The
accumulated experience and wise interpretation of history
make it not too sweeping a statement to claim that all
people in all places and times, contrary to socialized or
other ethical relativisms, must heed justice, virtue, and
higher law in order to thrive, whether in domestic or
international spheres.
As one acknowledges such ethical virtuosos as
Solzhenitsyn in our time, one can also remove oneself from
chronological snobbery and geographic provincialism in
order to stand on the broad shoulders of giants from both
the East and the West. Mencius, Mo Tzu, Plato, and
Aristotle allow one to see further and more clearly than the
constraints of ethical relativism or legal positivism or
A truly international
formalism would allow. 67
jurisprudence should be founded on that which is common
to the East and the West for all time. The fixation with the
recent and contemporary must make room for the wisdom
of the ages, which does not change with the shifting sands
66 As

a singular contrast in the midst of the Soviet oppression, Nobel

Laureate Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn powerfully conveys the
ideals of higher law. From his bombshell Commencement Address at
Harvard University in 1978 to the Hoover Institute at Stanford
University, from the Gulag Archipelago to The Oak and the Calf
Solzhenitsyn stunningly asseverates higher law. See, e.g., Aleksandr
Isayevich Solzhenitsn, Address at Harvard University (1978);
ALEKsANDR ISAYEviCH SOLZHENrTSN, THE OAK AND THE CALF (Harry
Willetts trans., Harper & Row 1980); ALEKsANDR ISAYEVICH
SoLzHENrrSN, GULAG ARCHIPELAGO (1st ed. 1985).
67 To borrow and modify a modest disclaimer by Sir Isaac Newton, "If
I have seen further, it is because I have stood on the shoulders of
giants." Letter from Sir Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1676).
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68

of time.
Helping to dig a truly transnational and
international jurisprudential foundation toward a more
widespread recognition of the existence of objective
justice, virtue, and higher law is an important foundation to
consider before asking questions about any particular legal
system, international and domestic alike.
These first
sections have introduced this topic, demonstrated its
relevance, and addressed objections that exist to justice,
virtue, and higher law as a jurisprudential basis. This
treatment now extends to a constructive case with a view
from the East, in conjunction with classical sources from
the West.
I. A View From the East
Classical Eastern philosophers, often ignored or
given scant treatment in the West, have much to teach us
about the necessity of adhering to justice and higher law in
order for law and the polis to flourish, domestically or
internationally. They write much of virtue, which merges
with broader notions of justice-indeed justice itself is a
classic, linchpin virtue. Virtue also always comports with
the higher law. In order to regain a more adequate
adherence to virtue, justice, and higher law, most notably
for transnational or international law, one must delve into
the relevant portions of Eastern philosophies.
Around 1122 BC, the Chou Empire conquered the
Shang people. Instructions issued by a Chou ruler to one of
his vassals said, "I will explain to you how virtue should
control the use of punishments .... Make your judgments

68

If international law and other law do not more fully regain their

moorings in just reality, virtue, and higher law, then we will reap much
bitter fruit in the future of the world. Much positive law begging for
conscientious objections may then increase.
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justly and sincerely." 69 Even a ruler of these marauding
conquerors not only referred to, but also exhorted, the
exercise of just judgments. Such just judgments surely rise
above the arbitrary and capricious, the inconsistent and
unfair. Thus, justice grounded in the higher law is a prized
virtue.
Mo Tzu, who was primarily raised on
Confucianism, started his own school of thought,
comparable to classical Confucianism. About the need for
the just administration of law and order, he articulated a
theory applicable to both the international and domestic
arenas. Tzu writes:
Now all the rulers desire their provinces to
be wealthy, their people to be numerous, and
their jurisdiction to secure order. But what
they obtain is not wealth but poverty, not
multitude but scarcity, not order but chaosthis is to lose what they desire and obtain
what they abhor. Why is this?
This is because the rulers have failed to
exalt the virtuous and to employ the capable
in their governments. When the virtuous
officers become numerous in a state, order
will be stable. Therefore the task of the
lords lies no where but in multiplying the
virtuous. But what is the way to multiply
the virtuous?
Suppose, for example, that one wishes to
cause good archers and charioteers to be
numerous. In this case one will certainly
enrich them, give them rank, respect them,
and laud them. Once these things are done,
69

THE SHE

KING 396-97 (James Legge trans., Trubner & Co. 1875).
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good archers and charioteers will become
numerous. How much more should this be
done in the case of the virtuous and
excellent who are rich in virtuous conduct,
versed in argumentation, and experienced in
the arts of the Way? These are certainly the
treasures of the nation and the supports of
the state. They too must be enriched, given
rank, respected, and lauded; once this is
done, they too will be numerous. 70
The passage quoted above outlines both the wisdom and
method of instilling virtue, of which justice is a central one,
and installing virtuous leaders. 7 1 Both results bring greater
justice to a society and encourage greater adherence to
higher law.
Such objectives rise higher than a
72
behaviorism unattached to magnanimous ends, such as
advancing the common good.
Mo Tzu apparently agreed with Confucius that the
hereditary rulers should transfer the administration of their
governments to men of virtue and capacity. 73 At its best, it
should not be reduced into a purely pragmatic, behaviorist,
or utilitarian calculus-although it can appear that way on
its face and can reduce to such calculi in its crasser forms.

70

MOTSE, THE ETHICAL AND POLmCAL WORKS OF MOTSE

30-31 (Mei

Yi-Pao trans., Probsthian 1929).
71 See Douglas W. Cassel, Jr., Somoza's Revenge: A New Judge for the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 13 HuM. RTS. L.J., 137 n.4

(1992) (discussing the debate surrounding the moral qualification for a
justice
on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights).
72
See IvAN PAvLOv, EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS
(Philosophy

Library

REINFORCEMENT:

1957); B.F.

SKINNER,

A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

CONTINGENCIES

OF

(Appleton-Century-

Crafts 1969).
73 MOTSE, supranote 71, at 19.
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A. Mencius
In the midst of a high-water mark for the popularity
of Mo Tzu's way of thinking, the so-called "agricultural
school" of Mencius emerged.74 It maintained that "a wise
and virtuous ruler tills the soil together with his people in
order to get his food; along with governing, he cooks his
own meals morning and night.",75 Underlying this notion is
the principle that those who rule and judge should know the
life of the people they rule or judge.
Apparently, Mencius followed the example of
Confucius in a number of ways. 76 Mencius eloquently
asserted the claim of the scholar and the man of virtue to a
place of honor above that which is conferred by the pomp
of princes. Such a man, as expressed by Mencius, should
regard worldly success and failure with indifference, secure
in the knowledge that, if his character is as it should be and
the world fails to acclaim him, the fault lies not with
himself but with the world. 77 That is the sort of virtue that
is worthy of notice, and refreshing in an age of hype and
celebrity production. Describing the just and virtuously
great person, Mencius says:

74 Mencius' opinion foreshadows and antedates by millennia the views
of this nation's founders such as George Washington, who tilled the
soil himself at Mount Vernon, and Thomas Jefferson, who had greater
trust in the hard-working, ordinary agrarian than some of his oligarchic
contemporaries.
71 THE FOUR BOOKS, 3 (2) 10 (James Legge trans., Commercial Press
1966).
76 For example, he was as democratic as Confucius in accepting
students regardless of their socioeconomic or political standing,
demonstrating an unusually egalitarian educational ethic. THE FOUR
BoOKS, supra note 76, at 19.
77ld. at (1) 9.
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Dwelling in the wide house of the world,
occupying his correct place in the world,
walking in the great way of the world; when
his desire for office is fulfilled, practicing
his principles along with others; when that
desire is disappointed, practicing them
alone; riches and honors cannot corrupt him,
poverty and mean condition cannot change
him, authority and power cannot make him
78
bend the knee: such is the truly great man.
Earlier, Confucius told the rulers to transfer the
administration of their governments to men of virtue,
ability, and education, 7 9 which Mencius fully concurs with
as the previous quote partially describes.
"One who outrages the human virtues is called a
brigand; one who transgresses against righteousness is
called a ruffian. I have heard that the fellow called Chou
was put to death, but I have not heard that this was killing a
sovereign." 80 In regards to the regicide of the last Shang
ruler, Menicus stated this when asked about it by the King
of Ch'i. Evidently, Mencius then placed just and virtuous
character above brute power or position, even the position
of king. For Mencius, might does not equal right, nor does
positional authority by itself necessarily denote the exercise
Hence, the basic postulate of Mencius'
of justice.
sociopolitical and legal program asserted that virtues such
as justice, above all else, breed success in the most
78

Id. at 3 (2) 2.3. As we shall see later in this study, similar notions

also occurred in prominent Western thinkers. We need many more
such great and just people, who not only reflect higher law in their
jurisprudence, but also in their very lives.
'9See CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS (David Hinton trans., Counterpoint
1998); CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS (Raymond Dawson trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1993).
'0THE FOUR BOOKS, supranote 76, at 1 (2) 8.
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profound sense of the word. 81
Mencius directly counters a representation of one of
Mo Tzu's principal arguments on its face, namely that the
necessity of something's utility or profitableness as
bedrock. This argument could also be said to counter
Western utilitarian arguments advanced by scholars such as
John Stuart Mill82 and Jeremy Bentham, 83 who rehash
some of the same hackneyed utilitarianism much later in
another part of the world.
The following passage also emphasizes the
necessity of going beyond the narrowness of short-term,
shortsighted personal utility and profitability. The book of
Mencius begins:
Mencius went to see King Hwuy of Leang.
The king said, "Venerable sir, since you
have not counted it far to come here, a
distance of a thousand li, I presume that you
are likewise provided with counsels to profit
my kingdom?" Mencius replied, "Why
must Your Majesty use the word 'profit'?
What I am 'likewise provided with, are
counsels to benevolence and righteousness,
and these are my only topics. If Your
Majesty say, 'What is to be done to profit
my kingdom?' the great officers will say,
'What is to be done to profit our families?'
and the inferior officers and the common
people will say, 'What is to be done to profit
our persons?' Superiors and inferiors will
81

The point here is not an advocacy of regicide or other killing of a

judge or sovereign. Rather, it dramatically underscores the importance
ofjustice and virtue in any legal and political system.
82 MuLL,supra note 33.
supranote 33.
83 BENTHAK,
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try to snatch this profit the one from the
other,
and' 84 the
kingdom
will
be
endangered.
Clearly, a simplistic profit-seeking and utilitarian
perspective fails to reach that just and virtuous height that
Mencius advocates. Those who advance justice and higher
law typically do not obsess about profit-and
may indeed
85
causes.
higher
for
ways
sacrifice in various
Continuing this argument, Mencius points out that
such a condition will put the king in the precarious position
of losing his life to a subordinate who covets his position
and his wealth. He continues:
There never has been a man trained to
benevolence who neglected his parents.
There has never been a man trained to
righteousness who made his sovereign an
after consideration. Let Your Majesty also
say, 'Benevolence and righteousness, and
these shall be the only themes.' Why must
86
you use that word-'profit'?
Such a stance undermines reductionistic "bottom line"
pursuits of profit to the exclusion of virtue, an approach
unworthy of the more exalted calling of justice and higher
law.
Similar to Confucius's and Aristotle's contentions,
Mencius claimed that the good is that which is most fully
congruent with human nature. 87 But, the Legalists of
" THE FOUR BOOKS, supra note 76, at 429-31.

For example, surveys demonstrate that public interest attorneys make
the least income, yet have the highest satisfaction in their work of any
segment of the legal profession. They often make greater impacts for
justice
too.
86
85

THE FOUR BOOKS, supra note 76, at 432.

87

id.
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China would contend that Mencius had an unduly
optimistic view of human nature. 88 All of them,however,
agreed with the necessity of actions in accordance with
sound justice and other virtues, and the necessity of higher
law beyond brute force or sheer authority alone.
Returning to Mencius, he vouched for "education"
chiefly as a means to cultivate a good sense of justice in
accordance with original human nature. 89 He observes,
"That which differentiates men from the birds and beasts is
very slight; ordinary men discard it, superior men preserve
,,9

it.

B. Tao
A basic principle of Taoism is that one should be in
harmony with, not in rebellion against, the foundational
laws of the universe. 91 Such a tenet presupposes the
existence of foundational laws of the universe-in other
words, higher law. 92
According to contemplative Taoism, living in
accordance with the fundamental laws of the universe
includes maintaining insouciance towards power, position,
or honors in this world. 93 Taoist works speak of various
sages who declined the offices of prime ministers and did
88

89

id.

The argument that education cultivates justice is similar to Platonic

"memory" or analogous to a pre-fall state of Edenic innocence in the
Judeo-Christian view. See Genesis 1:1-3:24.
90 THE FOUR BOOKS, supra note 76, at 14 (2) 19.1. Mencius' position
implicitly endorses the proposition that one must always act justly and
virtuously because everything one does will impact, for good or ill, the
development of one's own character. That statement would necessarily
include everything that one does within the legal profession.
91Id.

92 U.S. legal scholars in the present period of history certainly do not
hold such an assumption universally, which accentuates the need for its
rediscovery.
93THE FOURBOOKS, supra note 76, at 14 (2) 19.1.
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not seize the offer of thrones. 94 Thus, a Taoist living
according to these ideals would live above the vainglory,
conceit, and arrogance that often accompany rulership in
this life.
The Taoist position is more susceptible to the
critique of erring too far towards a phlegmatic, even at
times irresponsible, indifference to such matters. For
example, it also fails to provide a sufficient notion of
resource stewardship in its flight away from materialism,
greed, and selfish ambition. If taken too far, Taosim almost
crowns apathy as a virtue. It would be no virtue, for
example, to be apathetic or phlegmatic to international
human rights violations that should be upheld worldwide.
Nonetheless, Taoism still adheres to a form of higher law.
C. Hsuntze
The philosopher Hsuntze also notes the selfinterested proclivities of humans that Taoism apparently
attempts to remedy. 95 Hsuntze's views contrast with the
Taoists in what he considers "natural." While a Taoist
considers becoming "natural" as the crux of the answer,
Hsuntze sees our "natural" condition as problematic from
birth. 96 He says:
The original nature of man to-day is to seek
for gain. If this desire is followed, strife and
rapacity results, and courtesy dies. Man
originally is envious and naturally hates
others .

.

. Therefore to give rein to man's

original nature, to follow man's feelings,
inevitably results in strife and rapacity,
94 id

95 See XuNzi, THE WORKS OF HsuNTzE (Homer H. Dubs trans.,

Probstain 1928).
9 id.
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together with violations of etiquette and
confusion in the proper way of doing things,
and reverts to a state of violence. Therefore
the civilizing influence of teachers and laws,
the guidance of the rules of proper conduct
(Li) and justice (Yi) is absolutely necessary.
. . By this line of reasoning it is evident that
the nature97of man is evil and his goodness is
acquired.
This view not only serves as a counter point to the
views of Mencius, but it also impinges upon other
perspectives. What some thinkers consider the motivating
forces (e.g., a la Adam Smith 98 and other capitalists),
others (e.g., Karl Marx and Mao Tse-Tung) see as
These systems,
problems with capitalistic systems.
Hsuntze would likely say, beg for virtues of temperance,
justice, and content generosity through the fostering of
character, education, and laws consonant with the higher
law. Legal systems ideally work as safeguards against the
self-interested tendencies of humanity.
To give another example, an extended but selective
quote from Hsuntze elaborates on key elements of his
vision of justice, especially in regard to virtuous
contentment (not to be confused with a smug complacence)
contrasted with disgruntled greed. The level of justice,
virtue, and accordance with higher law would increase with
its application. It contrasts moral laxness with morality,
materialism with satisfaction, anxiety with peace, and
anhedonia with virtuous pleasure and happiness. It would
accord well with Aristotle's notions of arete and
eudaimoniam, which translate to virtue and happiness.
Hsuntze writes:
97ld.

at

301.

98 See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONs 10 (C.J. Bullock ed.,

P.F. Collier & Son 1909).
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[T]here is no one who in their purpose
despises moral principles, who does not
value material things; and that there is no
one who does not externally value material
things and is not inwardly anxious; and that
there is no one whose actions deviate from
moral principles who is not in dangerous
circumstances; and that there is no one who
is in dangerous circumstances who is not
inwardly fearful. When the mind is anxious
and fearful, though the mouth be holding
meat, it will not recognize the flavour
thereof; though the ears hear bells and
drums, they will not recognize the sound
thereof... though the clothes be light and
warm, and he be sitting on a rush or fine
bamboo mat, the body will not recognize the
comfort thereof; for he may enjoy the
goodness of all things, yet he cannot be
contented.
If he gains a respite and
contentment,
his anxiety and fear
nevertheless do not leave him. For though
he be enjoying the goodness of all things,
yet he is greatly anxious; though he be
absorbing the benefit of all things, yet he
gains great injury... Although this sort of
man be made a marquis and called a prince,
he would be no whit different from a
common man or a robber; although he were
to ride in a nobleman's coach or wear a
crown, he would be no whit different from a
footless cripple. Then he could well be
called one who makes himself the servant of
material things. If the heart is tranquil and
contented, though the colours be below the
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ordinary, they can nourish the eyes; though
sounds be below the ordinary, they can
nourish the ears; coarse food and vegetable
soup can nourish the taste; coarse cotton
clothes and coarse hemp sandals can nourish
the body; a straw hut for a house, reed
screens for doors, straw beds, ancient plain
stands and mats can nourish the form. For a
person may be without the goodness of all
things, yet he can foster his enjoyment; he
may be without a position of high rank, but
he can foster his fame. If such a man were
given the empire, it would mean much for
the empire, but it would mean little for his
contentment and joy. Thus he could be
called one who makes his personality
important and makes material things his
servants.

99

Such a passage can serve a salubrious purpose if more
faithfully applied by those responsible for legal systems.
Indeed, Hsuntze's description may also be a virtuous
prescription that falls within higher law and justice for
societies and individuals everywhere.
D. Neo-Confucianists From Chu Hsi
We now move to one of the greatest, if not the
His
greatest, of the Neo-Confucianists, Chu Hsi.
interpretations of some of the classics were considered
authoritative on the official Chinese government exams for
almost six centuries, specifically from 1313 until 1905
when the government abrogated the exams. Addressing the
structure of justice and higher law built into the universe,
Chu Hsi avers that "[p]rinciples or 1i... are without birth
99 XUNZI,

supra note 96, at 298-99.
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and indestructible." 100 Changeless, they are all part of the
one great li, the Supreme Ultimate, which Chu Hsi equates
at times with the Tao. He recognized that principles of
justice and higher law are both equally applicable in the
Western Hemisphere as they have been in the East.
In reference to Mencius, another leading NeoConfucianist, Tai Chen states, "The ancients who wished to
illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the kingdom, first
ordered well their own states ... they first cultivated their
persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first
rectified their hearts." 10 1 Chen helped revive the centrality
of character development through virtue, a result that flows
from the pursuit of justice and higher law.
Chen reinforces these notions by recognizing the
place of "virtues as the sense of shame, humility, and the
knowledge of right and wrong."' 10 2 Chen combines both
emotivist and intellectual-cognitive dimensions in his
conception of virtue. A reduction of virtue to either a
emotivist or an intellectual-cognitive dimension alone,
however, misses the mark. Chen was not a moral skeptic,
but is often mired in the morass of doubt and despair in
regards to the epistemology of ethics.
Perhaps his witnessing actual failures of justice,
higher law, and virtue helps explain why Yen Fu, who
studied at the University of Edinburgh and translated
Western philosophical works into Chinese, brought a
scathing indictment after the first World War. Yen Fu
wrote, "It seems to me that in three centuries of progress
the people of the West have achieved four principles: to be
selfish, to kill others, to have little integrity, and to feel
little shame."' 103 From one who had formerly admired
100

H.G. CREEL, CHINESE THOUGHT FROM CONFUCIUS TO MAO TsE-

TUNG 207 (The Univ. of Chicago Press 1953).
101THE FOUR BOOKS, supra note 76, at 310-12.
102
103

CREEL, supra note 101, at 228-29.
YEN FU, HsUEH HENG, No. 18 6-7 (1923).
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Western culture, Yen Fu's words are sobering ones indeed.
The four "principles" Fu describes certainly would not lead
to a harmonious international or domestic legal system.
This survey identifies an Eastern pattern that
recognizes the existence of justice, virtue, and higher law
and points to various aspects of these principles-whether
indicated in "right living," Li, morality, Tao, or other
comparable terms. This reality, whichever appellation one
chooses to give it, forms the best foundation for law,
especially international law, which must carve out the
common inheritance of humanity in the midst of diverse
cultures.
I. The Pre-Socratics, Plato and Aristotle on Justice,
Higher Law and Virtue
Turning now from Asia to ancient Greece, let us
inquire into the Pre-Socratic, Platonic, and Aristotelian
conceptions of justice, virtue, and higher law which are
necessary to maintain the health of jurisprudence and the
law.
A. Pre-Socratics
The Pre-Socratics stress their continuity with the
past through the idea of a law-governed universe. 14 They
explain that the ordered processes of nature relate to the
growing ethical conviction, entrenched in their cultural
heritage, that just principles are rooted in reality. 105 This
emphasis has no part in the presumption that nature is
value-free.I°6 Modem meta-ethics, by contrast, puts on a
104

See Gregory Vlastos, Equality and Justice in Early Greek

Cosmologies, 42 CLAssICAL PHIL. 156-78 (1947).
105 See TERENCE IRWIN, CLASSICAL THOUGHT (Oxford Univ. Press
1989).

106See id.; WERNER JAEGER, PAIDELA: THE IDEALS OF GREEK CULTURE
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fagade of just discourse while denying the very existence of
a higher law.
An example of a law-governed universe from PreSocratic literature is found in Aeschylus's Oresteia.
Orestes becomes aware of a more rational justice than cruel
vindictiveness, a rule of law that seeks to virtuously
superintend, rather than further inflame, conflicting
interests. In this conception, the rule of reason overcomes
blind fate.
This movement towards a more virtuous
conception of higher law and an eternal, celestial court
gives hope for eventual justice in spite of present injustices.
Sophocles puts the following words in heroine
Antigone's mouth, which appeal to a higher law than the
king's orders. In response to the inquiry of whether she
flatly chose to disobey, she exclaims:
Naturally! Since Zeus never promulgated
Such a law. Nor will you find
That Justice publishes such laws to man
below.
I never thought your edicts had such force
They nullified the laws of heaven, which,
Unwritten, not proclaimed, can boast
A currency that everlastingly is valid;
An origin beyond the birth of man.
And I, whom no man's frown can frighten,
Am far from risking Heaven's favor by

flouting these. 107
This lyrical expression of the higher, heavenly law speaks
to its pre-historic origin, its eternal applicability, and its
binding position of ascendancy over even king-made
positive law in a monarchy.
Along similar lines, Heraclitus wrote that human
(Oxford
Univ. Press 1939).
10 7

OEDIPUS PLAYS, supranote 64, at 179.
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laws are nourished by one divine law that outlasts them
all-the higher law. 108 Heraclitus seeks an enlargement of
the rule of law beyond the city-state into a form of cosmic
justice. 109 Heraclitus also discussses a harmony of
opposites grounded in natural law, called Logos, which are
somewhat similar to the concept of yin and yang in some
Asian philosophies.ll 0 At times, Heraclitus actually seems
to identify Logos with the divine. A kind of cosmic justice,
so to say, is thus rooted in the Logos reality.'11 This truth
is foundational to an international jurisprudence especially,
but also to domestic ones.
The Sophists, on the other hand, put forth a position
widely held today-rhetoric shapes the appearance, which
is what is perceived and which has no grounding in justice,
virtue, or higher law. Such a stance can lead to the
position, attributed to Thrasymachus, that justice amounts
to the advantage of the more powerful, making it relative to
whoever wields the power, a positivist position that
No
antedates Hans Kelsen by many centuries. 112
no
and
Being,
Divine
a
of
knowledge
no
cosmology,
1
13
and potentially
cosmic justice enter into this brutish
114
logic of the
the
extend
if
we
Thus,
position.
brutal
'08

See, e.g., J.M. ROBINSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EARLY GREEK

PHILOSOPHY (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1968); THE PRE-SOCRATICS
(Philip Wheelwright ed., Odyssey Press 1966).
109

See

JONATHAN

BARNES,

THE

PRE-SOCRATIC

PHILOSOPHERS

(Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979).
110 For an elaboration on the notion of Logos, see 1 W.K.C. GUTHRIE,
A HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY 419-34 (Cambridge Univ. Press
1962).
111 See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 109; THE PRE-SOCRATICS supra
note 109.
112 PLATO, REPUBLIC (G.R.F. Ferrari ed., Tom Griffith trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
113 We would have the Hobbesian condition of "the life of man,
solitary, [poor], nasty, brutish, and short" THOMAS HOBBES,
104 (E.P. Dutton 1950).
LEVIATHAN
114
See THE PRE-SOCRATICS, supranote 109, at 239-50.
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proposition that justice amounts only to the dictates of the
powerful, oppression can, strangely enough, become
"justice." Such a position contorts itself thereby into a
logical contradiction.
The Sophists present the specter of legal positivism
and formalism that would preclude "[t]he Moment of Truth
for a practicing attorney [which] occurs whenever a
prospective client tells a story that seems morally
compelling but legally hopeless. .

.

. Too much injustice

thinking has
persists in the world because tired legal
5
inevitable.""
as
patterns
unjust
accepted
It fell, then, to the great Socrates to recall Athens to
the quest for true knowledge and justice, rather than
settling for the superficial appearances and conventions of
the Sophist "spin-doctors." He thereby enabled Plato to readdress the deep conditions of the human soul, and in doing
so, to bring into focus the idea of a structure of justice in
the universe and its transcendent source, notions
desperately needed in law, including international law,
whether in the West or in the East.
B. An Account of Socrates
At the trial where his life hung in the balance,
Socrates responded to the charge of corrupting the
Athenian youth:
I do nothing but go about persuading you
all, old and young alike, not to take thought
for your persons or your properties, but first
and chiefly to care about the greatest
improvement of the soul . . . I tell you that

virtue is not given by money, but that from
virtue comes money and every other good of
man, public as well as private. This is my
115

ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE ANTHOLOGY, supranote 7, at 289.
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teaching, and if this is the doctrine that
corrupts the youth, I am a mischievous
person... I sought to persuade every man
among you that he must look to himself and
seek virtue and wisdom before he looks to
his private interests .... The difficulty, my
friends, is not to avoid death, but to avoid
unrighteousness.
And will life be worth living, if that higher
part of man be destroyed, which is improved
16
by justice and depraved by injustice?
Socrates both describes and exemplifies a laudable life, one
that surely rose to supranormal n 7 proportions. Professor
Anthony D'Amato wrote that "to Socrates, and presumably
to the Athenian citizenry as a whole, judging from the
evidence which exists, a trial and judgment was simply an
attempt by the tribunal to apply 'the law,' an immutable
concept which somehow had a separate, independent
existence unchanged by specific cases."11 8 Herein lies
another statement of the higher law, which every epoch,
including the 21st century, ought to follow. Here is a noble
example of magnanimity in the face of manifest injustice.
Although Socrates himself faced death, he believed
that in the greater scheme of things, nothing ultimately
116 PLATO,

APOLOGY

30, 36, 39, 49 (B. Jowett trans., Random House

1937).
117 Plato's life rose to the supernormal at least in the statistical, socialpsychological sense, but more importantly in the sublime, moral sense.
See THE SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: A VALUE-COMMIrED
INTRODUCTION (Michael R. Leming et al. eds., Academic Books
1989)(drawing distinctions between variations of the term "normal" in
chapter on social change in theory and practice).
118 ANALYTIC JURIsPRUDENCE ANTHOLOGY, supra note 7, at 119,
quoted in Anthony D'Amato, Obligation to Obey the Law: A Study of
the Death of Socrates, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 1079, 1080 (1976).
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detrimental could happen to the good person. 1' 9 While this
sacrificial speech extolling justice and virtue was the
crowning achievement of Socrates' life, it is also a fitting
introduction to Socrates' prize pupil Plato, and his
contribution to this topic.
C. Plato
Many of Plato's dialogues concern the virtues, such
as justice, wisdom, and prudence.
Like many Asian
philosophers, his political writings, including Republic,
Statesman, and Laws, address the improvement of the
soul. 120

In the Republic, Plato reasoned that the guardians
were "to live together in the continual practice of virtue,
which was to be their sole pursuit." 12 1 One may question
whether most politicians, attorneys, judges, and other
national leaders actually believe that "[tihe art of politics
has to do with the soul: what gymnastics and medicine are
to the body, legislation and the administration of justice are
to the SoUl., 122 Thankfully, those who take seriously a
jurisprudence of justice, virtue, and higher law still
contemplate such statements. It hardly fits, however, the
mold of a demagogue who runs roughshod over his own
people.
Plato even criticized the renowned Pericles, saying
that Pericles should have sought "to implant justice in their
souls and take away injustice, to implant temperance and
119 SAINT AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD,

(Marcus Dods trans., Hafner

1945). St. Augustine expresses similar notions in works such as the
magisterial De Civitatis Dei, which many consider his magnum opus.
120

See generally, PLATO, LAWS (Benjamin

Jowett trans., Random

House 1937); PLATO, REPUBLIC, supra note 113; PLATO, STATESMAN
(Julia Annas & Robin Waterfield eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995).
121PLATO, TLMAEUS 18 (Donald J. Zeyl trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 2000).
122 PLATO, GORGIAS 464 (Walter Hamilton trans., Penguin Books
1971).
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take away intemperance, to implant virtue and take away
Plato's central thesis throughout his
every vice." 123
published works is that the most important task in this life
is the improvement of the soul through virtue.124 It is not a
mere, surface behaviorism. Rather, it is more akin to
Harold Koh's notion of internalization. 125 One might
question whether Plato's central thesis might find more
widespread and profounder application in international, as
well as domestic, law.
The Sophists are akin to the American public's
perception of the legal profession. Plato roundly criticizes
the Sophists' use of rhetoric as solely a way to win wealth
or power, rather than to instill virtue. 126 Plato shows the
problems with Thrasymachus's definition of justice as
whatever benefits the stronger because it assumes that the
strong really apprehend what is best, and thus, that they are
Thrasymachus's definition
wiser than the weak. 127
if people are constantly
anarchy
towards
move
suggests a
and illegitimately vying with each other for power and
dominance, and it leads to ignoring justice or defending
injustice as the better way to life. 128 These criticisms
actually apply to misguided relativism as applied to law,
and open the door to ill-conceived self-interest. This
threatens what Thomas Hobbes subsequently referred to as
the "[war] of every man against every man, this also is
consequent; that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of
Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no
place." 129 Furthermore, it can make no transcendently
binding distinction between good and evil, justice and
injustice. If what Gandhi called soul force does not prevail,
1231Id. at 504, 513-14.
PLATO, REPUBLIC, supranote 113, at 338-52.
125 Koh, supra note 10.
126 PATO,REPUBLIC, supra note 113.
12 4

127

128

129

id.

id.
HOBBES, supra note 114, at 112.
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then other force-be it military, governmental, or legaloften does. 130 International law generally depends more on
its stake in justice and higher law than the march of troops
to enforce their orders. It usually must win voluntary
acceptance of its jurisdiction and good-faith compliance
with its orders. Thus justice, virtue, and higher law gain
greater significance in the international law context.
In Phaedrus, Plato expresses concern about
sophistical rhetoric 131 that seems hauntingly applicable to
what passes as law and international law. According to this
view, the orator need only understand the beliefs of his
judges, who judge him on the art of persuasion, not on the
truth of the matter. 132 The orator can extol evil as being
good, and might persuade the public as well to do evil
instead of good. 133 He influences their souls, but without
true knowledge.' 34 To what end does he sway othersmerely self-interested ones? Such criticisms must be taken
seriously if legal and political discourse is to rise above
sophistry.
This position does not, however, exclude
prudential uses of rhetorical (yet honest) tools harnessed to
just causes in accordance with higher law and justice
because there is an important distinction between these two
positions.
When distilled, one of the issues is between opinion
and knowledge and the other between appearance and
reality. When Protagoras expresses the opinion that man is
the measure of all things, this notion, if logically pushed to
its limits, affirms all opinions-including the opinion that
his own opinion is false. 135 So even Protagoras must admit
130 Dr. Samuel Ling, Asian History Lecture (Spring 1996).
131 PLATO, PHAEDRAS, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 169-72, 177-79 (B.
Jowett trans., 4th ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1964) (1871).
132

Id.

133

id.

134 id.

135

PLATO, THEAETETUS, in 4 THE DiALoGUEs OF PLATO 268-69, 288-

90, 304-06, 308 (B. Jowett trans., 3d ed., Clarendon Press 1892).
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that at least one opinion is wiser and truer than another; but
this deduction makes the wiser and truer notions into the
measure of things. Thus, man in general is not the measure
of all things because not all opinions are equally valuable,
true, wise, or worthwhile. 136 So there must be some anchor
of justice, virtue, and higher law, such as the related set of
honesty, veracity, and integrity, as contrasted with
mendaciousness, duplicity and falseness, by which to
ground such statements.
The relativist is deceived into thinking that, because
the world is continually changing in its temporal
particularities, justice, virtue, and higher law are also
mutating. If so, then everything is in a process of
becoming; unchanging "being," or in other words,
permanent, essential ontologies, are then abolished. Noting
that appearances and temporal contingencies change does
not lead one ineluctably to conclude that the underlying
reality changes too.
137
Plato's famous cave analogy speaks to this point.
The Sophist relativist is like a prisoner who, suffering from
a form of amnesia and confined to a world of flitting
shadows, supposes these appearances to be all the reality
there is. 138 If he could think, if he could look behind
himself, if he could exit the cave, his reality would be very
different. 139 The Sophist fails because his rhetoric is not
liberated by knowledge of the truth, but is instead a slave to
opinions based on appearances, the convenience of
expedience, temporal contingencies, prestige, or other
factors that vary from place to place and from one
individual to another. 140 Sophistical resistance to justice,
other virtues, and higher law fails. This statement applies
13 6

id.

13

7 id.
138 id.
139 id.

140 id.
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to all sophistical opinions-whether by judicial, legislative,
or executive branches.
Sheer pragmatism or formalism is not enough.
Justice and injustice are not changing expedients for
changing circumstances; they are rooted in a changeless
reality indiscernible by the physical senses alone. So then
it is not Socrates, but the Sophists, who impoverished the
souls of Athenian youth by failing to extol justice, virtue,
and higher law.
In Timaeus, Plato discusses how God set things in
order and constructed the cosmos by giving to all things
proportion, measure, and harmony. 14 1 According to Plato,
this cosmic harmony should extend to the law-governed
city where justice means the harmony of right, just
relationships, and proportionate treatment, and also to the
good life ruled wisely by the virtue graced soul. 14 2 As
musical harmony depends on mathematical relationships
between notes, so must human life be properly ordered if it
is not to end in painful discord, dissolution, or even death.
Indeed Plato declares, "The harmony of the soul is
virtue. ' 143 So the discussion again centers on virtue. Even
modicums of virtue can help prevent some of the tragedies
that legal systems repeatedly endure.
In Republic, Plato calls for rule by wise,
philosopher-kings rigorously educated to disciplined habits
aimed at true understanding and the continual pursuit of the
good. 144 Such people can help add to the stature of legal
systems and the profession.
Plato's theory of forms as unchanging, transcendent
1 45
ideals
becomes relevant here.
Reason1'46 does not
141

PLATO, TIMAEUs, supranote 122.

142 Id.

143

PLATO, LAWS, supranote 121, at 653.
REPUBLIC, supra note 113.
Id.
The use of the term "reason" is in the broader, classical sense. It

144PLATO,
145

146

includes virtue and a healthy conscience along with rationality and
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develop mere opinions about justice and then apply them in
governing the appetites. 147 The mind does not fabricate
virtues, but rather it discovers what is objectively and
The goal is to attain, however
inherently good. 148
imperfectly or fallibly, to what justice, virtue, and higher
law really are, rather than how they appear to a
Thrasymachus or to any other person. An objective rooting
in real justice, virtue, and higher law still exists, and a just
legal system, by definition, depends upon these149realities
and our best efforts to apprehend and apply them.
In Laws, Plato proposes the model of a lawgoverned community in which the people themselves value
the good. 150 Indeed, a person's entire energy throughout
life should be devoted to the development of virtue. Plato
but God
ultimately concludes that it is not mere mortals,
151
who ought to be the measure of all things.
It is important to note that Plato's conception of
knowledge is not just a matter of knowledge as against
ignorance or opinion, nor just an ability to define or
describe a virtue. 152 Discernment between good and evil is
required, along with the practiced capacity for making
sound judgments that recognize goodness when
logic.
147 PLATO, REPUBLIC,

supra note 113.

148 id.
149

Many centuries later, scholars such as St. Thomas Aquinas and

others built on this foundation. See, e.g., THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE
ON LAW (R.J. Henle trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1993).
Presumably, one should not extend hate towards people, but to that
which contravenes justice. Hating injustice because of loving [Greek:
agape] people against whom the injustice is wrought deserves the label
virtue. At the same time, that hate should not extend even to the
perpetrator of the injustice.
150 PLATO, LAWS, supra note 121.
151 See id. at 653, 717, 770.
152

See JOHN GOULD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF PLATO'S ETHICs (Russell

& Russell 1972) (1955).
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exemplified in particular cases. 53 Furthermore, it is not a
detached, unemotional kind of thinking, but is filled with
wonder at and a deep devotion to the good. 154 Such a
framework exercises virtue, pursues justice, and comports
with higher law.
Plato employs the analogy of a lover absorbed day
and night with his beloved, or rather, with the ideals that
the beloved exemplifies. 155 According to Plato, our calling
in the legal and governmental spheres and in life is to
romance and be romanced by justice, virtue, and higher
law.
Similarly, in Phaedrus Plato likens the soul to a
charioteer with two winged horses, one wanton and wild,
the other spirited but controllable, soaring towards the sun
in all its majesty. I 56 As long as the wanton horse is
uncontrolled, there can be no united effort and both horse
and charioteer plunge down to the earth again and again. 157
But if the driver guides the spirited horse while giving it
the lead, then its strength will control the wanton one 158
so
that they will pull together and soar to the heavens.
Plato speaks of the higher aspects of humans harnessing the
appetitive or animal side. 159 The brute inside must be
disciplined to soar to the heavens.16° Otherwise, the host
of horrors that parade through this world will march on.
Plato, as an encapsulation, states, "Wherefore we
ought to fly away from earth to heaven as quickly as we
can; and to fly away is to become like God, as far as this is
possible; and to become like him is to become holy, just,
153 id.

154id.
155

Id.

156 PLATO,

PHAEDRAS

supra note 132.

157 id.
158

id.

59

1

Id.

160Id.
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and wise." 16 1 In other words, it is an exhortation towards a
just and virtuous life under the highest possible law. This
view has become all too rare as Western Civilization has
Berman calls the "twilight of
reached what Harold
62
1
transcendence."
Plato continues this same theme in Laws when he
writes that "he who would be dear to God must, as far as is
possible, be like him and such as he is." 163 Several motifs
emerge from these writings. First, this entire metaphysical
discussion grounds itself in unchanging and transcendent
Fact and Reality-in virtue, justice, and higher law. In this
sense, law is a fact. 164 Second, Plato's forms theory
introduced a theory of universals with unchanging natures
that dominated the jurisprudence of most of the history of
Western Civilization, which continues to this day. This is
the best foundational theory for international law and law
in general.
In Statesman, Plato likens God to a statesman
shepherding his people, but in Laws Plato offers his last
and most detailed account. 165 Plato describes God as
powerful, purposeful, intelligent, and good in an outgoing
way because everything he designs is directed toward the
overall goodness of the universe. 166 Individual virtue and
the just city-state are supposed to be part of this cosmic
PLATO, THEAEETIUs, supranote 136, at 235.
See BERMAN, supranote 4.
163
PLATO, Laws, available at
161

162

http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/laws.4.iv.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
For an alternative translation, see also PLATO, THE LAWS 175 (Trevor
J. Saunders trans., Penguin Books 1970) ("you must do your level best
to make your own character reflect his, and on this principle the
moderate man is God's friend, being like him").
164 See Anthony D'Amato, On the Connection Between Law and
Justice, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527 (1993).
165 See, e.g., PLATO, LAWS, supra note 121, at 894-903; PLATO,
STATESMAN, supranote 121, at 269-75
166 See, e.g., PLATO, LAWS, supranote 121.
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harmony. Because they imitate God's goodness, they are
microcosms of the whole.167 Each legal system, whether
international or domestic, can aspire to such lofty
objectives.
The chief purpose of Timaeus seems to be to link
justice to the structure of the cosmos-higher law. 168 This
higher law grounds itself in reality, in the forms, in the
nature of the soul, in cosmic harmony, in the idea of the
good, and in God. No better theoretical framework exists.
In contrast to secularized individualism, skepticism,
and relativism that prevail in present legal culture, Plato
tells the reader:
The ruler of the universe has ordered all
things with a view to the excellence and
preservation of the whole, and each part, as
far as may be, has an action and passion
appropriate to it. . . one of these portions of
the universe is thine own, unhappy man,
which, however little, contributes to the
whole . . . and in order that the life of the
whole may be blessed; and that you are
created for the sake of the whole, and not
the whole for the sake of you. 169
167 Id.
16 8

supra note 122.
Laws, availableat

PLATO, TIRAEUS,

69

1

ATO,

http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/laws. 1O.x.html.
For an
alternate
translation, see also PLATO, THE LAWS 437 (Trevor J. Saunders trans.,
Penguin Books 1970) ("The supervisor of the universe has arranged
everything with an eye to its preservation and excellence, and its
individual parts lay appropriate active or passive roles according to
their various capacities... a mere speck that nevertheless constantly
contributes to the good of the whole - is you, you who have forgotten
that nothing is created except to provide the entire universe with a life
of prosperity. You forget that creation is not for your benefit: you
exist for the sake of the universe.").
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Hence, Plato thinks the good is ultimately found in a more
wholistic and community context, and ultimately, in the
mind of God. If law does not contribute in this way, it
loses an important facet of its raisond'etre.
In their thinking about the cosmos, the early Greek
philosophers struggled to distinguish between appearances
and reality. Plato and Aristotle extended this concern into
the metaphysical domain suggesting that what appears to
some to be the good in reality may not be so.170 Pleasure,
wealth, power, or success may be sought as the highest
ends, when in reality they are not. This confusion between
appearance and reality in ethics underlies the contest
between two dominant images of human life that Alasdair
Macntyre finds in a post-Homeric reflection-a life
aiming at virtue or excellence (arete) and a life aiming at
superficial "success" or power. 171 Every branch of
government would do well to pursue the former rather than
the latter.
The former image of virtue or excellence (arete) is
found in the works of Plato and Aristotle. The latter image
of superficial success or power is also found in the writings
1 72
of Aristotle's one-time student, Alexander the Great.
Neither power nor success, nor pleasure, nor wealth is in
reality the highest good, even though to some people they
appear so. This claim does not deny the value of success,
pleasure, or wealth in the service of virtuous ends.
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle concerned themselves
with the improvement of the soul and developed an ethic of
virtue grounded in the ordered nature of reality as a
whole. 173 Those in or influential to legal systems would be
170 id.
171

ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY?

88

of Notre Dame Press 1988).
(Univ.
172
id.

See FINNIS, supra note 7, at ch. 8 (analyzing and synthesizing
important strands of thought of these foremost Hellenic thinkers).
173
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well advised to follow such an approach rather than making
positivistic or formalistic excuses for injustice, vice, or
violations of higher law. To Plato's student, Aristotle, we
turn next for further grounding in justice, virtue, and higher
law the best basis for law as a whole and international law
especially.
D. Aristotle: Justice, Telos, Virtue, and the Higher
Life through Higher Law
Aristotle merges the notion of justice with virtue by
crowning justice as the apogee of virtue in relation to
others:
Thus, this kind of justice is complete virtue
or excellence, not in an unqualified sense,
but in relation to our fellow men. And for
that reason justice is regarded as the highest
of all virtues, more admirable than morning
star, and, as the proverb has it, "In justice
every virtue is summed up." It is complete
virtue and excellence in the fullest sense,
because it is the practice of complete virtue.
It is complete because he who possesses it
can make use of his virtue in their own
affairs, but who are incapable of using it in
their relations with others. Therefore, the
saying of Bias seems to be apt that "Ruling
will show the man," for being a ruler already
implies acting in relation to one's fellow
men and within society. For the very same
reason, justice alone of all the virtues is
thought to be the good of another, because it
is a relation to our fellow men in that it does
what is of advantage to others, either to a
ruler or to a fellow member of society.
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Now, the worst man is he who practices
wickedness toward himself as well as his
friends, but the best man is not one who
practices virtue toward himself, but who
others. For that is a hard
practices it toward
174
achieve.
thing to
Aristotle does not stop with justice as a perfect
virtue in human relationships alone. In addition, he hints at
the relation between human virtue, higher law, justice, and
the divine. 175 Being is not morally neutral; in fact, the
world of particulars is laden with issues of justice
throughout, 176 including matters in the international law
domain, as well as domestic law spheres.
Aristotle states:
If God is always in that good state in which
we sometimes are, this compels our wonder:
and if in a better state this compels it yet
more. And God is in a better state. And life
belongs to God; for the actuality of thought
is life, and God is that actuality .... We say
therefore that God is a living being, eternal,
most good, so that life and duration
1 77
continuous and eternal belong to God."'
The just and virtuous-the human telos178 -is the
full development of this potential, 179 which is our highest
174

ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN

ETIncs 114 (Martin Ostwald trans.,

Macmillan 1986) (internal citations omitted).
175 Id.
176 Id.
177

ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, available at

http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics. 12.xii.html.
178 In Greek, telos means "end" or "purpose." "God and nature," writes
Aristotle, "create nothing that has not its use." ARISTOTLE, ON THE
HEAVENS, 271A.33 (Harv. Univ. Press 2000) (1957).
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good. It is eudaimonia, usually translated "happiness," but
actually closer to "well-being," although "well" simply
reiterates "good" ("being" itself being good). Aristotle
elaborates: the human good is the activity of the soul in
accordance with virtue (arete).180 Such activity never
violates and always harmonizes with higher law.
Moral virtues are the excellence of the appetitive
life, whereas intellectual virtues indicate excellence in the
life of the mind. 18 1
Such human flourishing is
compromised, according to Aristotle, in those who live for
pleasure, wealth, or honor. Other animals have such
appetites too, yet only humans have the power to reason
including the healthy functioning of the conscience and to
guide those appetites. 182 The human telos does not exclude
pleasure or other such satisfactions; indeed, achieving the
good brings its own pleasure. 183 No other species has
courts, legislatures, or executive branches-or the
deliberative processes found in legal, political, and
academic discussions.
Actualizing such a life is a developmental process;
the Maker grants the capacity, but to develop it requires
just habits. Just habits require just choices repeatedly made
and reinforced until they become second nature. 184 Just
choices, in turn, must be determined by practical reason
deliberating about what accords with higher law. The
various appetites, as well as pleasure and pain in general,
may be felt both too much and too little, and neither side of
the spectrum from the balanced center is good. 185 But to
"9 Potential translates to dunamis in the Greek.
180 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICs supra note 175; see also JOHN
IvL COOPER, REASON AND HUMAN GOOD IN ARISTOTLE ch. 1 (Harv.

Univ. Press 1975).
'8'
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, supra note 178.
182 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETICS, supra note 175, at 16-17.
183 Id. at 20-22.
184 Id. at 33-35.
185 Id. at 36-38.
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feel them, at the right times, with reference to the right
objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and
in the just way, mediates between these extremes and
characterizes virtue. 186 Herein, we find Aristotle's famous
Golden Mean between extremes. 187
So what are the implications for jurisprudence, for
the state, and for laws? The "best kind of state exists not
just to provide external goods but for the good of the
soul-in effect, to make men good ... the state therefore
inculcates right habits by means of just laws."188 Aristotle
also states, "For legal judgment decides and distinguishes
between what is just and what is unjust."1 89 This venerable
sage continues:
This is why we do not allow the rule of a
man but the rule of reason because a man
takes too large a share for himself and
becomes a tyrant. A (true) ruler, however, is
the guardian of what is just and as such, he
guardian of equality and
is also the
190
fairness.
All in society, especially those distinctly responsible as
leaders of the legal and political realms, should help further
such ends that abide by the rule of law, nourished by higher
law through justice.
Henry Veatch, an Aristotle scholar, tells us that the
most important end of knowledge is not knowledge of
humankind, because humans are not the most important
entities in the universe. 191 According to Aristotle, the very
186 id.
871d
188

at 111.

ARISTOTLE, THE POLmCS,

1.1-2, VII.1-3 (Steven Everson ed.,

Cambridge Univ. Press 1988).
189

ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS,

'90Id. at 130.
191 See HENRY

B.

VEATCH,

supra note 175, at 129-30.
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nature of our being points us beyond ourselves; humans are
not the measure of all things, for only God is perfectly
good. 192 In reality, the human telos, our highest end, is
God. 193 Pursuing justice, virtue, and higher law created by
the Uncreated 194 then justly becomes the virtuous pursuit
of every state and every legal system, most vividly in the
international sphere, but also in domestic realms.
IV. Conclusion
In any legal system, but especially international
legal systems, this foundation of justice, virtue, and higher
law alone will sustain long-term flourishing and
fulfillment, both individually and societally. It points the
way towards progress and needed reform of positive law.
The accumulated weight of wise words over the centuries
from both the East and the West1 9 5 exhort us in this

direction. It is a safeguard against such monstrosities as
Nazi, Maoist, and Stalinist oppression, and acts as a beacon
to light the way into the future of our global village.
The words of the great 20th-century Princeton
McCormick Chairholder and jurisprudential scholar Edwin
Corwin provide a fitting finale to this essay:
There are, it is predicated, certain principles
of right and justice which are entitled to
prevail of their own intrinsic excellence,
APPRECIATION

(Indiana Univ. Press 1974).

192 id.
193 Id.
194

As Dostoevsky indicated, if God is dead, then everything is

permissible. See FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOv
(Ralph E. Matlaw ed., Constance Garnett trans., Norton & Co. 1976);
see also, FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Constance
Gamett trans., Dutton 1963).
195 See Finnis, supra note 7, at ch. 8 (handling profound thoughts from
Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas).
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altogether regardless of the attitude of those
who wield the physical resources of the
community. Such principles were made by
no human hands. . . .They are eternal and
immutable. In relation to such principles,
human laws are, when entitled to obedience
save as to matters indifferent, merely a
record or transcript, and their enactment an
act not of will or power but one of discovery
and declaration. 1
Thus, the pronouncements of every legal system,
international especially, but also domestic, the judgments
of every court, the formulations of every legislature, the
decisions of every executive, should discover,1 97 declare
It would result in greater
and follow accordingly.
worthiness to lead and greater legitimacy for people to
follow. Herein, lay the seeds of true progress1 98 and
reform.

supranote 9, at 4-5 (emphasis in original).
"In contrast, natural lawyers claim that morality is not so much to be
defined as to be discovered; reality is not created but apprehended."
NATURAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC POLICY, supranote 18, at
8.
198 While rejecting the notion of automatic, inexorable "progress," the
use here nonetheless promises progress to the extent justice, higher
law, and virtue are embraced.
196

CORWNI,

197
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